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Tropical Medicine and Bacteriology
in Boston and Peru:
Studies of Carrion's Disease in the
early Twentieth Century
MARCOS CUETO*
Recent historical studies on medicine as a tool of empire have underlined the
importance of local perceptions and responses when analysing the strategies and impact
ofEuropean and North-American powers in various regions ofthe globe.1 These studies
have suggested that the development of tropical medicine has not been a one-way street,
that the rich texture of local societies occupied a central place in this process, and that
authority had to be negotiated and accommodated by recipients who were able to redefine
imported ideas and institutions.2 This article adds to this literature by using comparative
history and by suggesting that developments in the so-called "periphery" provide crucial
insight into the work ofthe metropolitan scientific centres.
This article analyses the achievements and difficulties confronted both by Peruvian
researchers trying to reinforce a local medical culture in a poor country and by U.S.
investigators endeavouring to persuade philanthropic sponsors of the need to establish
tropical medicine as an independent academic subject. The story takes place in early
twentieth-century Peru, a country that in the wake of its defeat in the War with Chile
(1879-1883) initiated a process ofnational reconstruction and modernization based on an
agreement with foreign bondholders. This included ceding control of its railroads for
sixty-six years, the arrival of major U.S. investments which displaced the dominant
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position ofBritish interests in the country, the export ofa variety ofboth agricultural and
mineral products that reduced its vulnerability to international price fluctuations, and the
emergence ofacivilian political elite that ruled the country between 1895 and 1919 under
a democratic system ofcontrolled elections.3
During the early twentieth century, Peruvian bacteriological research occurred almost
exclusively in Lima, the capital city, and concentrated mainly on native illnesses,
particularly human bartonellosis, a puzzling disease unique to the Andes, also known as
Carrion's disease. These studies became an important ingredient of an emerging medical
culture.4 The findings ofPeruvians were challenged by Harvard scientists, members ofan
ephemeral School of Tropical Medicine in Boston, who organized two expeditions to
Peru. This controversy also reveals the different role played by tropical studies in two
countries with very different degrees ofeconomic, social and scientific development, and
the contingency and validation of knowledge in tropical medicine in Boston and Peru
during the early twentieth century.
Carri6n and the Disease
The eponym Carrion's disease was used to honour amedical student who was interested
in understanding two diseases which were considered to be different clinical entities:
verruga peruana (literally Peruvian wart) and Oroya fever. The former had been known
since pre-Hispanic times, and was recognized as a nodular eruption on the skin which
might last from a few weeks to several months. These skin eruptions were unlike those
produced by other types of warts found in the rest of the world (hence the name verruga
peruana).5
Factual data on Oroya fever dated from 1870, when an epidemic of fever and anaemia
killed thousands ofworkers who were building the trans-Andean railway from Lima to La
Oroya, a major mining town. Because the epidemic was not followed by a geographical
spread of the disease, medical authorities named it "Oroya fever".6 The delay in
recognizing Oroya fever (in contrast with verruga) is attributed to the fact that its main
symptoms, fever and anaemia, could be confused with many diseases.
The government, the British Central Railroad Company, which operated all trains in the
country, and, after 1901, the U.S. Cerro de Pasco Cooper Corporation, which used the
Andean Central Railway to get its minerals to Lima, were very much concerned by Oroya
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Columbia University Press, 1978, pp. 21-111.
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David Weinman and Miodrag Ristic (eds), Infectious
blood diseases ofman andanimals, New York,
Academic Press, 1968, vol. 2, pp. 3-24.
5 The first full clinical description ofthe disease
was Tomas Salazar, 'Historia de las verrugas',
Gaceta Medica de Lima, 1858, 2: 161-4. For the pre-
Columbian origin of the disease, see M J Allison, A
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Anthropol., 1985, 41: 295-300; Raoul d'Harcourt, La
medecine dans l'ancien Pe6rou, Paris, Librairie
Maloine, 1939; and Pablo Patr6n, La verruga de los
conquistadores del Peru, Lima, La Cronica Medica,
1889.
6 The disease did not exist in La Oroya, the name
simply reflected the final point of the railroad. R P
Strong, C E Tyzzer, C T Brues, A W Sellars, and J C
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fever because the Central Railway was the chiefartery oftransport between the coast and
the mining centres in the central Andes. Many lives were lostto the disease every time the
line was repaired or rebuilt.
Verruga peruana and Oroya fever attracted the attention of students and professors of
the School of Medicine in Lima which was part of Peru's main University, San Marcos,
and the only medical school in the whole country. In August 1885, a medical student,
Daniel A Carrion, seeking to understand the pre-eruptive symptoms of verruga peruana,
asked a fellow student to inoculate him with blood from a hospital patient afflicted with
the disease. After an incubation period of twenty-one days, Carri6n showed no sign of
warts, but he began to suffer from fever and anaemia, the two main symptoms of Oroya
fever. A few days before he died, Carrion claimed that both diseases had the same origin.7
Other Peruvians doctors had previously maintained that verruga peruana and Oroya fever
were manifestations ofthe same disease, but these statements appeared only as comments
made in medical circles.8
Initially, some authorities reacted to Carrion's death negatively.9 This was partly
because Carrion did not use in his inoculation any of the scientific resources available at
the time, such as microscopic observation ofthe inoculated blood orbacteriological blood
cultures. A delayed autopsy produced insufficient evidence to conclude whether Carrion
died ofOroya fever or ofa form ofsepticaemia.10 In response to the criticism, and to the
threat of a lawsuit by the sub-prefect of Lima, Carrion's fellow students launched a
campaign extolling him as a hero of science who had demonstrated that the two native
illnesses shared the same origin.
Within a few years, Carrion's experience became an exemplary component of an
emergent medical culture in Peru. Carrion's behaviour was presented as similar to that of
famous European researchers of the nineteenth century who had experimented on
themselves andtheirassociates with virulentmicrobes.' 1 Thus Carri6n was converted into
a "6martyr" of Peruvian medicine and his inoculation became a "sacrifice" for science.12
Subsequently, Peruvian physicians used the term "Carri6n's disease" rather than verruga
peruana or Oroya fever, and elaborated a so-called "unifying" (in Spanish unicista)
explanation ofthe origin ofthe two diseases.
7 The literature on Carri6n is abundant and usually
repetitive. See Luis Antonio Eguiguren, El
Estudiante de medicina DanielA. Carri6n (proceso
judicial sobre su gloriosa muerte), Lima, Editorial
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Lima, Editorial San Marcos, 1957; Francisco Linares
Cabrera, 'Influencia de la vida y obra de Daniel A.
Carri6n en la historia de la medicina peruana', BA
thesis, Universidad de San Marcos, 1958; Jose B
Penlaloza Jarrin, 'Daniel A. Carri6n, hombre de
ciencia (con documentos in6ditos)', BA thesis,
Universidad de San Marcos, 1958; David Frisancho
Pineda y Oscar Frisancho Velarde, El Estudiante, la
verruga y la muerte, Lima, Editorial Los Andes,
1986, and Oscar G Pamo Reyna, DanielA. Carri6n,
Lima, Editorial Visi6n Peruana, 1987.
8 David Matto, 'Discurso leido en la sesi6n del 5
de Octubre de 1886', La Cronica Me'dica, 1886,
3: 376-80.
9 According to a former dean ofthe Medical
Faculty: "Science has gained little, discredit ofthe
profession has increased and the precious existence
of an unwary young student has been snatched
away." Ignacio La Puente, 'Una vfctima de la
ciencia', El Campe6n, 6 Oct. 1885, reproduced by
Casimiro Medina (ed.), La verrugaperuana y Daniel
A. Carri6n, Lima, Imp. del Estado, 1886, pp. 67-8.
10Myron G Schultz, 'Daniel Carri6n's experiment',
New EnglandJ. Med., 1968, 278: 1323-6.
1 On self-experimentation, see Lawrence K
Altman, Who goesfirst?: the story ofself-
experimentation in medicine, New York, Random
House, 1986.
12 For an illuminating account of the process ofthe
glorification ofCarri6n, see Uriel Garcia Caceres,
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Peruana Cayetano Heredia, 1970.
346Tropical Medicine andBacteriology in Boston and Peru
The appearance ofsuch a hero contributed much to the professional identity and public
legitimation ofPeruvian medical doctors. During the late nineteenth century in the major
Peruvian cities, San Marcos' physicians had to compete with Indian healers (the
occupations of herbalist, healer and sorcerer were not strictly separated in the Indian
culture), itinerant quacks (who were sometimes Europeans) and Chinese herbalists (who
were part of an urban Chinese colony created by the importation of Chinese indentured
labour during the nineteenth century). The assumption that modem medicine and western
science was superior to any other form ofknowledge was instrumental in displacing those
health practitioners who were foreigners or who were not members of the upper and
middle classes. Furthermore, Carri6n's experience gave physicians a hero, casting around
them an aura ofcivic virtue.
After Carri6n, Peruvian doctors regarded the two diseases as the severe and the mild
forms of the same illness. The development of a wart eruption was regarded as an
indication of a favourable outcome, and irritants were applied to the skin ofpatients with
Oroya fever to induce early appearance of the skin lesion. The first comprehensive
description of Carri6n's disease, written in French and published in Paris by the Peruvian
physician Emesto Odriozola, drew the attention of European scientists to a peculiar
disease believed to occur only on the western slopes of the Andes at altitudes of between
800 and 1,500 metres.13
Odriozola's book was a landmark for Peruvian physicians who championed a French-
influenced medical culture based on a combination of clinical and geographic
observations that did not seek to integrate the medical systems used by indigenous
healers.14 This culture emphasized the specific climatic characteristics ofPeru like the fact
that, despite its location in a tropical latitude, the coast is mostly arid, has a mild
temperature and little rainfall because of the combined effects of the Andes and cold
Pacific currents. The book was also instrumental in underlining the beliefs of Peruvian
physicians that the understanding of the unique medical geography of Peru demanded
prolonged clinical practice and observation and that usually foreign physicians were
ignorant of the crucial relationship between Peruvian topography and illness, partly
because they came with preconceived medical ideas or remained only briefly in the
country.
Odriozola's work sustained the beliefin the etiological unity ofthe two illnesses using
only clinical and geographical evidence (the two conditions occurred in the same
locations). In addition, he and other Peruvian physicians, such as Edmundo Escomel,
noted that persons who contracted verruga did not suffer from a second attack; nor did
they contract Oroya fever, and vice versa. Despite the fact that Escomel had trained in
France as a bacteriologist, most ofhis studies on Carrion's disease were of an anatomical
13 Ernesto Odriozola, La Maladie de Carri6n ou la Henry E Sigerist on the sociology ofmedicine, ed.
verruga peruvien, Paris, Carre et Naud, 1898. Later Milton I Roemer, New York, M. D. Publications,
studies established that Carri6n's disease can also be 1966, pp. 299-307. The Peruvian medical culture
found on the eastern side of the Andes. See David that emphasized the uniqueness of its medical
Weinman, Infectious anemias due to bartonella and geography can be traced to a physician ofthe turn of
related cellparasites, Philadelphia, American the nineteenth century, Hip6lito Unanue. See John E
Philosophical Society, 1944, p. 273. Woodham, 'The influence ofHip6lito Unanue on
14 On medical geography, see Henry E Sigerist, Peruvian medical science, 1789-1820: areappraisal',
'Problems ofhistorical-geography pathology', in Hisp. Am. hist. Rev., 1970, 50: 693-714.
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and clinical nature.15 The perception of Carrion as a medical hero and the local tradition
that emphasized clinical observation and medical geography contributed to the main
assumption of Peruvian bacteriology, namely that Oroya fever and verruga peruana had
the same etiology.'6
The Reception ofBacteriology
Local resources in bacteriology appeared in Lima at the turn ofthe twentieth century as
a result ofEuropean influence in the school ofmedicine and a more sophisticated response
to a plague epidemic. At this time, various Peruvians were trained in Paris and London,
such as Ricardo Flores, who donated a bacteriology laboratory to the Faculty, and David
Matto, who was hired in 1890 on a permanent basis to fill the chair of bacteriology, a
position he held until 1914.17 At least as important for the rise of bacteriology, was the
bubonic plague epidemic that attacked the Peruvian coast in 1903. Plague provided the
immediate stimulus, and political occasion, for the creation of new state and municipal-
supported institutions concerned with bacteriological research.18
The fragile margin between basic and applied research in their specialty permitted
bacteriologists to attract support for research by arguing that science was a powerful tool
in the detection, prevention and cure of infectious diseases which ravaged the country.
More regular support was given to bacteriology because of the need to produce sera and
vaccines, study native illnesses, and control the use of insecticides and disinfectants.
These measures were considered necessary to protect the urban and port populations, to
attract coveted European immigrants, and to foster trade and investment in the rising
export economy of Peru. Thus, by the early 1900s bacteriological laboratories existed at
the Instituto Nacional de Vacuna y Seroterapia (which depended upon the Direccion de
Salubridad Piblica, a branch ofthe Ministry of Development); the Instituto Municipal de
Higiene, which was directed by the Italian bacteriologist Ugo Biffi; and in some hospitals
including the magnificent Hospital Dos de Mayo, used for clinical instruction, and the
Hospital Guadalupe at Callao, the chief seaport of Peru located eight miles west of Lima.
Some of the physicians trained in bacteriology by Matto at San Marcos University
found positions in these new institutions. Oswaldo Hercelles, whose thesis was an
histological study of Carrion's disease, became, in 1906, director of the bacteriological
laboratory of the Dos de Mayo hospital, where he was able to form a small staff of
researchers. Hercelles' career suggests the lack of specialization of the first Peruvian
bacteriologists and their combination of different medical paradigms since, in addition to
his position as chief bacteriologist at the hospital, from 1910, he was also professor of
pathological anatomy at San Marcos.19
15 Edmundo Escomel, Anatomie pathologique du 'David Matto, 1859-1914, noticia necrol6gica', La
verrucome de Carrion, Paris, Masson, 1902. Cr6nica Medica, 1914,31: 353-9.
16 Uriel Garcia Caceres and Fernando U Garcia, 18 See Marcos Cueto, 'La ciudad y las ratas: la peste
'Bartonellosis, an immunodepressive disease and the bub6nica en Lima y en la costa peruana a comienzos
life of Daniel Alcides Carri6n', Am. J. clin. Path., del siglo veinte', Hist6rica, 1991, 15: 1-26.
April1991, 95: 58-66. 19 On Hercelles, see Jorge Avendafio, Perfiles de la
'7David Matto, 'Bacteriologia, lecci6n de apertura medicina peruana, Lima, Universidad de San
del curso', La Cronica Medica, 1892, 9: 179-84; and Marcos, 1983, pp. 33-4.
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Early Peruvian bacteriologists displayed originality and perseverance in their work. By
the turn of the century, bacteriological research could be undertaken at the centres
mentioned above, each of which possessed such essentials as microscopes, glassware,
bacteriological stains, specialized literature and trained staff. Peruvian scientists allocated
these resources to the study ofnative illnesses, in particular Carri6n's disease. Solving its
etiology offered the opportunity to associate the name ofthe discoverer with an emerging
national medical tradition. Peruvians were aware that European, American and Japanese
scientists were determining the etiology ofmany infectious diseases, but the search forthe
causative agent of verruga peruana and Oroya fever was a research area where
competition was initially limited to Peruvians. As in other cases of emerging disciplines
in Latin America, the bacteriology of a disease specific to a country became the focus of
a local research tradition because of the comparative advantages enjoyed by local
scientists.20
The medical theses of San Marcos stand out among the first bacteriological studies of
Carri6n's disease. Notable among them was that ofAlberto Barton, born in 1871, a son of
British immigrants, who became the key figure among local bacteriologists. In his 1901
thesis, Barton identified and described foreign bodies in the red blood cells ofOroyafever
patients. Barton considered these bodies to be the causative microbe ofCarrion's disease,
and they became known as the "Barton bacillus".2'
However, Manuel 0 Tamayo, who studied at the Pasteur Institute in Paris and replaced
Biffi as chiefbacteriologist at the Instituto Municipal de Higiene in 1903 when the Italian
returned home, demonstrated that although the so-called "Barton bacillus" existed, it was
not the pathogenic agent of Carri6n's disease.22 Later research proved that Barton had
described an already known bacteria of the coli-typhoid group.23 For years, Tamayo and
Julio CesarGastiaburu, his colleague at the Instituto, argued that Barton's bodies were red
cell alterations, ofvalue in the diagnosis ofOroya fever, but not the causative agent.24
Barton recognized his mistake, and decided to complement his training by seeking a
government fellowship to study at the School ofTropical Medicine in London. In 1905 he
was back in Lima, working again on the etiology of Carri6n's disease. Based on new
studies, Barton announced in 1909 the discovery of the causative agent.25 This time
Barton was certain that the filamentous bodies he had identified in the blood of Oroya
feverpatients, in the form ofbacilli, were different from any other known organisms. It is
interesting to note that the central aspect of Barton's work was its morphological
20 A similar case is the work ofthe Brazilian descubrimiento de la bartonella', PhD diss.,
Carlos Chagas's on Trypanosoma cruzi. See 'Carlos Universidad de San Marcos, 1973, p. 147.
Chagas', in Charles Coulston Gillispie (ed.), 24 Manuel Tamayo, 'Un ensayo de vacunaci6n
Dictionary ofscientific biography, New York, contra los tifosimiles de la verruga febril', La
Charles Scribner's sons, 1976, vol. 3, pp. 185-6. Cronica Medica, 1906, 23: 295-305; and Manuel 0
21 The thesis appeared as a book, Alberto Barton, Tamayo and Julio Gastiaburu, 'Un ensayo de
El germenpato5geno de la enfennedad de Carrio$n, clasificaci6n de los similtificos de la verruga febril',
Lima, Libreria E Moreno, 1901. La Cr6nica Medica, 1907, 24: 321-32. See also
22 Manuel 0 Tamayo, 'Apuntes sobre la Emesto Odriozola, Estado actual de nuestros
bacteriologfa de la enfermedad de Carri6n', Gaceta conocimientos acerca de la enfermedad de Carrion o
de los Hospitales, 1905, 2: 516-29. verrugaperuana, Lima, La Opini6n Nacional, 1908.
23 According to one author Barton rediscovered the 25 Alberto Barton, 'Descripci6n de elementos endo-
organism that caused typhoid fever, a microbe which globulares hallados en los enfermos de fiebre
had been already studied by Ebert in 1880. Hugo verrucosa (articulo preliminar)', La Cronica Medica,
Vizcarra Franco, 'Contribuci6n hist6rica en el 1909, 26: 7-10.
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description of a new microorganism. Barton limited himself to describing the exterior
characteristics of the bacilli and to indicating the most appropriate stains for their
observation. He pointed out that the bacilli multiplied themselves in the Oroya fever
victims, and decreased in numbers, until they almostdisappeared, when the patients broke
out in warts. From this observation he deduced that Oroya fever was an hypertoxic form
of verruga peruana, in other words, that both clinical conditions were different
manifestations ofthe same disease.
Later Barton was credited with establishing that Carri6n's disease has a first, hematic,
phase, known as Oroya fever, in which the intracellular bodies parasitize and destroy the
red blood cells of the patient, who manifests extreme anaemia. Oroya fever was
considered generally fatal (before antibiotics the mortality rate has been estimated at
between 30 to 70 per cent of severe cases). Verruga peruana, the second phase, is
characterized by cutaneous eruptions and is usually not fatal. This phase generally
signifies the patient's recovery when the Bartonella bacillifornis bacteria in the blood
reduce in number or disappear.26
However, most contemporary Peruvian researchers did not accept Barton's findings.
For many, the microbes reported by Barton in 1909 were no more than cellular
degenerations, ofvalue in the diagnosis ofOroya fever, but not the causative agents ofthe
disease.27 For example, Carlos Monge Medrano, who studied at the School of Tropical
Medicine in London between 1911 and 1912, wrote in 1912, "Up to the present time no
one has succeeded in finding the specific cause ofthe infection".28 This conclusion can be
understood as aresult ofthe mistrust produced by Barton's earlier mistake and, even more
important, his peripheral position in the fragile group of Peruvian bacteriologists. These
scientists were all concentrated in Lima, they did not have a local specialized journal but
used the main medical journals like La Cr6nica Medica, and never organized an
independent scientific society but were members of general medical societies like the
Academia Nacional de Medicina and the Sociedad Medica Union Femandina.
Afterreturning from England, Barton was unable to find aposition in the university and
worked for years as the director of the laboratory ofthe Hospital Guadalupe of Callao, a
second-class facility compared to other laboratories inLima. Barton gave little importance
topublication while otherbacteriologists were remarkably overproductive. Barton's entire
scientific work between 1901 and 1946 (mostly during the first two decades of the
twentieth century) amounted to a total of 13 publications (including books, pamphlets and
academic articles). By contrast, Edmundo Escomel, a contemporary who worked not only
in bacteriology, had by 1929 atotal of354 medical and scientific publications to his credit.
Monge Medrano, thirteen years younger than Barton, published between 1912 and 1925 a
total of 54 articles. Monge's work was mainly related to tropical diseases and was done
before the research in high-altitude physiology which made him well-known all over the
26 On the mortality rate and other aspects ofthe suppose that they were the pathogenic agents of the
disease, see Oscar Urteaga-Ball6n, 'Carri6n's Peruvian wart", Raul Rebagliati, Verruga peruana:
Disease', in Kenneth F Kiple (ed.), The Cambridge enfermedad de Carri6n, Lima, Imp. Torres Aguirre,
world history ofhuman disease, Cambridge 1940, p. 33.
University Press, 1993, pp. 631-5. 28 Carlos Monge Medrano, 'Carri6n's disease or
27 A scientist recalled the scepticism that Barton verruga peruana', J. Lond. Sch. trop. Med., 1912,
had to confront: "no one wanted to believe in 1: 163-8.
[Barton's bodies'] lively nature and even less to
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world.29 For Peruvian scientists such as Escomel and Monge Medrano overproduction
was crucial to attract local recognition and support, although it was frequently achieved
through studies of very specific clinical cases and repetition ofdata. Barton's low rate of
publication reduced his visibility and made recognition more difficult. Around 1920, he
abandoned research and medical practice to work in the soft drinks industry, becoming a
successful entrepeneur in Peru.
While Peruvian bacteriologists were uncertain ofBarton's findings of 1909, during the
1910s European and U.S. investigators became interested in Carri6n's disease. One ofthe
first Americans who worked on it was the entomologist Charles Townsend. He was hired
by the Peruvian government in 1913 for a series of studies, including a search for the
vector of Oroya fever. Some local physicians thought a mosquito was the carrier.30
Believing that Carrion's disease and Rocky Mountain spotted fever had a similar mode of
transmission, Townsend began by considering ticks and lizard mites as probablevectors.31
After obtaining negative results, he searched for an insect whose distribution and habits
fitted the geography and night-time exposure ofhumans. Townsend identified a nocturnal
sandfly, known as titira, which was the vector of Oroya fever (then named Phlebotomus
verrucarum and today known as Lutzomyia verrucarum).32
Another American scientist who became very interested in Carrion's disease was
Richard P Strong. In 1913 a commission of Harvard scientists directed by Strong visited
Lima and confirmed that the bacillus discovered by Barton was a new organism. Only
then was Barton given local recognition for his finding of 1909. Strong was a leading
figure of tropical medicine in the USA, and his involvement with a Peruvian disease is
better understood against his wider background.
Strong and Harvard
Trained atJohns Hopkins Medical School, Richard P Strong was aphysician serving as
afirstlieutenantin the Army when in 1901 he was appointed to head aboard to investigate
tropical diseases in the Philippines. His work was part of the military concern with
diseases in occupied tropical and semi-tropical territories like Cuba and the Philippines.
After finishing his investigation, he was induced to resign from the Army to organize and
29 The number ofpublications is taken from the
detailed accounts that appear in 'Bibliograffa de
Alberto Barton'-, Anuario bibliogrdfico peruano
1949-1950, Lima, Biblioteca Nacional, 1954,
pp. 305-7; 'Tftulos, comisiones y trabajos de
Edmundo Escomel', in El Libro de oro de los
homenajes recibidos por el Dr. Edmundo Escomel,
Lima, Imprenta Torres Aguirre, 1928;
'Biobibliografia de Carlos Monge Medrano',
Anuario bibliogrdfico peruano 1970-1971, Lima,
Biblioteca Nacional, 1978, pp. 662-91. On Monge
Medrano, see Marcos Cueto, 'Andean biology in
Peru, scientific styles on the periphery', Isis, 1989,
80: 640-58.
30 'No hay verruga en Matucana: estudios y
declaraciones del DoctorBarton', La Prensa, 21 April
1912, p.2; andMfiximo G6mez, Epidemiologia de la
enfermedadde Carrio$n o verrugaperuana en las
pmvincias de Yauyos y Cantete, contribuci6n a la
patologia de este mal, Lima, Tipografia Nacional, 1912.
31 Charles Townsend, 'Two years' investigation in
Peru ofverruga and its insect transmission', Am. J.
trop. Dis. preventive Med., 1915, 3: 16-32.
32 His first article published in Peru was: 'La Titira
es transmisora de la verruga', La Cronica Medica,
1913, 30: 210-11. For an account ofentomological
studies on Carri6n's disease see Marshall Hertig,
'Phlebotomus and Carri6n's Disease', Supplement to
the American Journal ofTropicalMedicine, 1942,
vol. 22, pages unnumbered. See also Hideyo
Noguchi, et al., 'The etiology ofOroya fever. The
insect vector ofCarri6n's disease', J. exp. Med.,
1929, 49: 993-1008; and Tel6maco Battistini, 'La
verruge peruvienne (sa transmission par le
phlebotome)', Revue Sud-Ame'ricaine de Medecine et
de Chirurgie, 1931, 7: 719-24.
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direct the first Philippine Biological Laboratory. Strong remained in Manila for the next
twelve years, apart from a year's study in Berlin. At Manila, he became professor of
tropical medicine at the University of the Philippines, director of the biological
laboratories ofthe Philippines Bureau of Science, and chiefofthe medical department of
the city's General Hospital. In 1911, he achieved international distinction as head of a
commission that advised on the control of an epidemic of pneumonic plague in
Manchuria.33
The prestige of Strong attracted the attention of Frederick C Shattuck, the Jackson
Professor of Clinical Medicine at Harvard, who in 1913 offered him a position at
Harvard's Medical School as the first director ofthe newly created Department ofTropical
Medicine.34 The new Department was launched with a fund of$25,325 which guaranteed
its existence for only five years.35 The main contributors were Harvard alumni and Boston
companies and merchants who were recruited by an active fund-raising campaign
organized by Shattuck. They included diplomats like Larz Anderson, who had served
during the Spanish American War of 1898; physicians with a strong interest in Asia like
William S Bigelow; prestigious lawyers like Henry B Cabot and Elliot Lee, who were on
the boards of directors of several companies; prominent bankers and merchants like
William Endicott and Wallace Pierce; and a former governor ofthe Philippines, Cameron
Forbes.36 After 1914, additional donors to the School included the United Fruit Company,
which had a virtual monopoly on the production and distribution of Central American
bananas and other important investments in Latin America.37
These funds were crucial because financing tropical medicine lay outside the Medical
School's regular budget.38 Moreover, there was some covert opposition by other
professors who saw tropical medicine as an exotic self-financing venture, directed by a
professor with no tenure or full-time salary. Seeking to legitimate his department, Strong
set out to publicize the need for tropical medicine. He emphasized the urgent need to
protect United States commercial interests and citizens during a period of increased
33 In memory ofRichard Pearson Strong, Boston,
Harvard School ofPublic Heath, n.d., p. 7; and Eli
Chemin, 'Richard Pearson Strong and the
Manchurian epidemic ofpneumonic plague,
1910-1911', J. Hist. Med. AlliedSci., 1989,
44: 296-319.
34 For an account ofthese years, see George C
Shattuck, Tropical medicine at Harvard 1909-1954,
Boston, Harvard School of Public Health, 1955. The
first U.S. school oftropical medicine was created a
few years before in Tulane University, New Orleans.
Strong's desire to take the position at Boston appears
in a letter to William Osler: "I decided that at the
present time I would have here the best opportunity
to develop the work in tropical medicine in this
country and a good opportunity to do work in
relation to the study oftropical diseases in South
America." Strong to William Osler, 30 January 1913.
Richard Pearson Strong Papers, Box 50, Folder
'Osler, Sir William', Francis Countway Library-
Harvard Medical School (hereafter FCL-HMS).
35 Edward H Bradford to Herey L Stimson,
11 January 1913, Strong Papers, Box 33, Folder
'Department ofTropical Medicine, Campaign for
Funds-Organization', FCL-HMS.
36 A list ofdonors appears in: Charles F Adams,
'Treasurer's statement for 1912-1913', in Official
registerofHarvard University, 20 April 1914,
vol. 11, p. 48; idem, 'Treasurer's statement for
1913-1914', in ibid., 1 March 1915, vol. 12, p. 45;
and idem, 'Treasurer's statement for 1914-1915' in
ibid., 15 March 1916, vol. 13, p. 45. Biographical
sketches of the donors appears in Albert Nelson
Marquis, Who's who in New England, Chicago,
Chicago A Marquis, 1909; and idem, Who's who in
America, Chicago, Chicago A Marquis, 1914-1915.
37 Also Shattuck made a gift of$100,000 to be
used for the maintenance oftropical medicine at
Harvard. Richard Strong, 'The School ofTropical
Medicine', Official Register ofHarvard University,
1917, vol. 14, p. 191.
38 Jean Alonzo Curran, Founders ofthe Harvard
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1909-1946, New York, Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation,
1970, p. 12.
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contact with the tropics.39 The construction of the Panama Canal and the foreseeable
marked increase in shipping reinforced this argument. With the advent of the Canal,
yellow feverregions such as the Caribbean wouldbe more fully integrated intothe world's
networks ofcommerce and travel. Tropical Asia, until then free ofyellow fever, possessed
all the preconditions needed for an epidemic of the disease. There was also a possibility
of reinfection of the U.S. South itself, a sub-tropical region that had experienced
epidemics ofyellow fever until the first years ofthe twentieth century.
Strong believed that there was a growing professional market for graduates in tropical
medicine. The argument was clearly explained byAmerican missionaries (deeply involvedin
evangelical workoverseas) who supportedthe establishment oftropical medicine atHarvard:
The services of physicians especially trained in the diseases more commonly encountered in hot
countries are frequently sought by various commercial firms ofdifferent countries who do business
in the tropics and who own mines or plantations or who employ a large amount ofnative labor ...
In addition, these firms pay good salaries . . . the [U.S.] government requires men well trained in
these diseases for civil positions in Cuba, Porto Rico [sic], Panama, Hawaii and Philippines.40
Strong also appealed to local pride, arguing that Boston should have a school oftropical
medicine of the rank of those already existing in London, Liverpool, Hamburg, and
Brussels. Following these arguments, Harvard University made an offer to President
Woodrow Wilson to train government medical officers in the Department of Tropical
Medicine before they were assigned to duty in the tropics.4'
Finally it appeared that Boston and Harvard offered good opportunities for supporting
tropical medicine. The city was one of the most important Atlantic seaports, receiving a
considerable number of cruises from tropical regions of the world. It was also the
headquarters of several American companies active in the tropics, including the United
Fruit Company. In addition, Harvard had a number of professors and institutions with a
strong interest in bacteriology, entomology, zoology, botany and other fields related to the
tropics such as those atthe BusseyInstitute, the Gray herbarium, the Botanical Garden and
Museum, the Arnold Arboretum, the Peabody Museum of Anthropology and other
University museums. The Medical Faculty included leaders in public health and tropical
science such as Milton J Rosenau professor ofpreventive medicine and hygiene, George
C Whipple, the Gordon McKay professorofsanitary engineering, Harold C Ernst, the first
professor of bacteriology, and Theobald Smith, the George Fabyan professor of
comparative pathology. When the Department opened its doors, Smith, Rosenau, and
Ernst were part of an advisory board to assist Strong, and courses in the new Department
were offered by professors from the departments ofzoology, entomology, botany, physics,
bacteriology, pathology, comparative pathology, and hygiene.42
39 The rationale for the creation of a department of 1913, Strong Papers, Box 33, Folder 'Department of
tropical medicine at Harvard is recounted in Richard a Tropical Medicine Campaign to fund Organization,
Strong, 'The modem period oftropical medicine', 1913-1914', FCL-HMS. Hilles was secretary to
Am. J. trop. Med., 1937, 17: 1-14. President Wilson.
40 The author ofthe letter was secretary ofthe 42 Eli Chernin, Tropical medicine at Harvard: the
American Board ofChristian Missionaries. James L Welleryears, 1954-1981, Boston, Harvard School of
Barton to E H Bradford, 1 February 1913, Strong Public Health, 1985, p. 1; and Richard Strong,
papers, no box, Folder B, FCL-HMS. 'Tropical medicine', Official register ofHarvard
4 Franklin MacVeach to C D Hilles, 4 February University, 15 March 1916, vol. 13, pp. 184-6.
1913; and Bradford to Herry L Stimson, 11 January
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As the first task of the Department, Richard Strong decided to organize a scientific
expedition to study diseases along the Pacific coast of South America, especially in
Ecuador and Peru. Using an argument parallel to that ofmany public health officers who
stressed the economic advantages of sanitation, Strong contended that his investigation
was crucial for U.S. economic expansion: "the nature ofthe diseases which exist in many
ofthese pest-holes must first be investigated . . . labor and capital needonly follow."43 The
expedition was planned for the summer of 1913, before the beginning of instruction, and
during a period when the Department needed to show, according to the Dean, that
"significant accomplishments" could be done "with a small amount ofmoney."44
Ecuador and Peru were chosen, first, because locations like the port city of Guayaquil
in Ecuador were considered hotbeds of tropical diseases and provided opportunities to
pick up materials for use in the instruction of Harvard students. Second, little was known
about this region in contrast with other areas ofLatin America, which had been studied by
the U.S. Army and the United Fruit Company and by the active indigenous scientific
community of Brazilian scientists.45 Third, the mystery surrounding Oroya fever and
verruga peruana represented a challenge and an opportunity to discover a new
microorganism. Finally, Strong also underlined the potential interest of American
companies in the Amazon region of Peru which comprised more than 60 per cent of the
country and was the home of the rubber tree.46 According to Strong the western side of
South America was: "from a commercial standpoint the largest underdeveloped area ofthe
Western hemisphere".47
The other members of the expedition were also from Harvard: Ernest Tyzzer, assistant
professor of pathology, Charles Brues, assistant professor of entomology, and A W
Sellars, associate professor of tropical medicine. In Peru, the Americans included in their
team the Peruvian bacteriologist Julio Cesar Gastiaburu, then director of the laboratory of
the Instituto Municipal de Higiene, who co-signed some of the final reports. Harvard
provided some funds for the expedition and the United Fruit Company and Pacific Steam
Navigation furnished free transportation from Boston to Peru. To reciprocate, Strong
agreed to inspect some of the eight hospitals established by United Fruit in Latin
America.48 The expedition visited Jamaica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, and reported on
the diverse diseases encountered. Their primary mission, however, was in Peru where they
studied verruga and Oroya fever. They also gave some attention to the native version of
leishmaniasis, locally known as uta, an infection caused by a flagellate protozoan that
43 Richard P Strong, 'Recent development in Luiz Antonio de Castro Santos, 'Power, ideology and
relation to the study of tropical medicine in the U.S.', public health in Brazil, 1889-1930', PhD Diss.,
Lecture given at Johns Hopkins anniversary, 5-8 Harvard University, 1987.
October 1914, Strong Papers, Box 15, Folder 'Johns 46 In the early twentieth century the Ford Motor
Hopkins, 1914', FCL-HMS. Company and Goodyear were interested in obtaining
Bradford to Herey L Stimson, 11 January 1913, better access to rubber trees in the Amazon so as not
Strong Papers, Box 33, Folder 'Department of to be dependent upon the rubber production of the
Tropical Medicine Campaign to fund Organization, Far East. See Warren Dean, Brazil and the struggle
1913-1914', FCL-HMS. for rubber: a study in environmental history,
45 See John Farley, Bilharzia: a history ofimperial Cambridge University Press, 1987.
tropical medicine, Cambridge University Press, 47 Strong, op. cit., note 39 above.
1991, p. 117; Jaime Larry Benchimol and Luiz 48 Edward Bradford to F H Dietz, 15 April 1913,
Antonio Teixeira, Cobras, lagartos y outros bichos: and Strong to Francis Hart, 28 March 1913, Strong
uma historia comparada dos institutos Oswaldo Cruz Papers, Box 4, Folder 'South American Expedition',
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parasitizes the tissues (although the etiology of this disease became clear only in the late
1920s). In Lima, Peruvian authorities and physicians gave support, and the British Central
Railroad Company provided facilities for studies carried out between Lima and La Oroya.
Strong and his associates worked at the laboratory ofthe Instituto Municipal de Higiene
where they experimented with animals and an inmate from the insane asylum.49
Interestingly, in the English version ofthe report the inmate was presented as a volunteer,
probably because of concern about public reaction to the use of humans in medical
experiments. Strong confirmed Barton's Oroya fever findings, and his observations
further indicated that the red cell structures reported by Barton in 1909 could hardly be
degeneration products, as Tamayo and Gastiaburu had argued, since they exhibited
motility, i.e. independent movement. Later studies indicated that Barton's bodies also
occurred in tissue cells not associated with red blood cells. In honour of its discoverer,
Strong proposed the creation of a new genus and named the Oroya fever microbe
Bartonella bacilliformis.50 In the final report published in English, Oroya fever was fully
described and elegantly illustrated.
The Harvard Commission vigorously questioned the Peruvian medical belief in the
identity of the two illnesses involved in Carrion's disease. According to Strong, Barton
had discovered the causative agent of Oroya fever, not the one that caused verruga
peruana. Strong's experiments failed to find Bartonella bacilliformis, or any other
microorganism, in the blood ofpersons suffering from verruga or in that of animals with
experimental verruga. However, they did succeed in transmitting the "virus" ofverruga to
experimental animals and to the asylum inmate, concluding that the disease was
inoculable, but they failed to obtain cultures ofthe organism.51 Strong's whole work was
consonant with that of many bacteriologists of the time who placed great importance on
standardized methods (basically the use of the Koch postulates), and who regarded it as
unlikely thata single disease could manifest itselfin two different ways.52 Only years later
did new studies such as those on chicken pox and shingles, which are expressions of the
same herpes virus, show the range ofmanifestations ofa single pathogen. Strong believed
that verruga must originate from a different, and still unknown, virus.
Even the validity ofCarrion's experiment was contradicted because the asylum inmate,
inoculated by Strong with tissue juice from a wart nodule, developed no symptoms of
Oroya fever and had only a mild verrucous lesion at the site ofthe inoculation. According
to Strong this experiment showed conclusively that verruga and Oroya fever were two
different diseases. In his report, Strong carefully stressed that, although he admired Daniel
Carrion, his death proved nothing. Strong suggested that Carrion probably died of "an
acute form of septicemia", or that the patient whose blood Carrion had used might have
49 The use of the patient was authorized by David 51 Richard Strong and E Tyzzer, 'Experiments
Matto, then director ofthe hospital and professor of relating to the virus of verruga peruana', J. Am. med.
bacteriology at San Marcos. The information appears Ass., 1915, 64: 1124-7.
in Strong, et al., op. cit., note 6 above, pp. 1-12. 52 Patricia Peck Gossel, 'A need for standard
50 Richard P Strong, E E Tizzer and A W Sellards, methods: the case of American bacteriology', in
'Fiebre de la Oroya, segundo informe', La Cronica Adele E Clarke and Joan H Fujimura (eds), The right
Medica, 1915, 32: 213-17; R P Strong, C E Tyzzer, toolsfor thejob: at work in twentieth-century life
C T Brues, A W Sellars, and J C Gastiaburu, sciences, Princeton University Press, 1992,
Harvard School ofTropical Medicine report ofthe pp. 287-311.
first expedition to South America, 1913, Cambridge,
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1915.
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been suffering from a concomitant infection of Oroya fever, making Carri6n's diagnostic
picture confusing.53
Before returning to the States, Strong read in a local newspaper that Peruvian
researchers had performed some of his experiments (such as the transmission of verruga
to rabbits) without acknowledging his own earlier work. He hastily sent a cablegram to
the Dean of the Harvard Medical School announcing his conclusions. The apparent
tension between Americans and Peruvians was expressed more clearly in a letter written
in Lima by Strong to Shattuck, his mentor at Harvard:
I felt it necessary to send the cablegram to ensure priority of our work for the University, as the
Peruvian doctors here are watching our work very closely, and have apparently tried to repeat every
experiment which they see us do ... and of course would prefer that we should not have anything
new which they were not able to report upon.54
A version ofthe cablegram was promptly published in a Harvard magazine celebrating
the "great step forward" in research and the "success [that] crowned the first enterprise"
ofHarvard's tropical medicine department.55 In his annual report, the Dean ofthe Harvard
Medical School applauded Strong's achievements.56 Upon returning to Boston, Strong
published articles in the Journal ofthe American Medical Association and a preliminary
report, which appeared in 1915 as a handsome book, that stressed that "the discoveries
made by the expedition should serve to emphasize the importance of sending from the
School to the tropics other expeditions of this nature".57 Strong sent a copy of the report
to thirty-seven prominent Bostonians, thanking them for their support of the Department
ofTropical Medicine "in its early struggling years".58 Complimentary replies emphasized
the value of Strong's work in terms ofnational interest and American largesse.59
The perception of an early "success" for the Department of Tropical Medicine was
instrumental in creating new alliances favouring academic tropical medicine at Harvard,
at least for a while. In 1914, the Deans of the Medical School and the Graduate School,
felt that "success in the development of the Department of Tropical Medicine was most
likely to be attained if Dr. Strong is given as free a hand as possible to develop his
ideas".60 His main idea, approved in 1914, was the transformation of the Department of
Tropical Medicine into an independent School offering doctoral degrees in tropical
medicine.
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Strong received further recognition in 1914, when he was appointed chiefofa new sub-
department of tropical medicine at the Massachusetts General Hospital, and consulting
physician in tropical diseases at the Boston City Hospital. In the same year, he was elected
President ofthe American Society of Tropical Medicine, and director of the laboratories
ofthe hospitals and research-work stations of the United Fruit Company. As director he,
and his students, could work in any of the hospitals that United Fruit managed in Costa
Rica, Panama, Guatemala, Colombia, Cuba and Honduras. Strong was very pleased with
the latter connection because it fulfilled his "desire to place candidates for the degree of
Doctor oftropical medicine in ... the United Fruit Company".61
However, the School began to face problems offunding because it depended mainly on
private patronage. In 1915, a request signed by A Lawrence Lowell, the President of
Harvard University, was presented to the Rockefeller Foundation for a grant of $50,000
per annum for ten years for the School of Tropical Medicine.62 The Foundation was
initially reluctant, because it was willing to consider a grant for the field of tropical
medicine only in connection with the whole subject ofpublic health. Lowell withdrew the
original proposal before receiving a formal rejection and requested aid for an Institute of
Hygiene at Harvard.63 The new proposal indicated a change in emphasis which affected
the development oftropical medicine at Harvard.
For some of the critics inside Harvard, other university institutions appeared to
duplicate some of the functions of Strong's School. These institutions included the
Department of Preventive Medicine and Hygiene created in 1909 (later known as the
Department ofHygiene ofthe Harvard Medical School); and thejoint venture School for
Health Officers ofHarvard and the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology created in 1913
(later known as the Harvard-MIT School of Public Health). The latter emphasized
industrial hygiene, which was perceived by some as more immediately relevant to the
economic needs ofthe U.S. than tropical medicine. An additional problem for the School
of Tropical Medicine was the small number of students enrolled at Harvard, and the
difficulties involved in finding them positions abroad, partly because, unlike Britain and
France, the United States barely possessed a formal empire, andbecause, according to one
public healthprofessor: "In many countries, public healthpositions are more orless pawns
in the political game'.M
After the creation of the School of Hygiene and Public Health at Johns Hopkins
University in 1916, which received sizeable donations from the Rockefeller Foundation,
tropical medicine began to be perceived in the U.S. as an academic discipline that was not
well defined and that did not merit independent institutional development because it
61 Strong to Frederick Shattuck, 22 July 1914, 63 The terms in which the petition was amended
Strong Papers, Box 23, Folder 'Shattuck, F.', FCL- appears in the letter ofA Lawrence Lowell to the
HMS. One ofStrong's associates considered the co- Trustees ofthe Rockefeller Foundation, 30 June
operation with the United Fruit Company as 1915, and 'Memorandum regarding request to endow
"exceptional". Sellars to Strong, 2 July 1914, Strong school forTropical Medicine at Harvard University,
Papers, Box 23, Folder 'Sellars, AW', FCL-HMS. June 29, 1915', Rockefeller Foundation Archives,
62A Lawrence Lowell, 'Application for aid in the R.G. 1.1. Series 200, Box 181, Folder 2186, RAC.
establishment and maintenance of a School of 64 David L Edsall, 'The School ofPublic Health',
Tropical Medicine at Harvard, May 10, 1915', in The development ofHarvard University since the
Rockefeller Foundation Archives, R.G. 1.1. Series inauguration ofPresident Elliot: 1869-1929,
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overlapped with the fields ofbacteriology and immunology, and, in dealing with problems
of poor sanitation and malnutrition, looked into conditions not restricted to tropical
areas.65 As a result, in 1924, the School of Tropical Medicine became a Department in a
new Harvard School of Public Health. Strong was appointed as its chairman. After his
retirement in the late 1930s, tropical medicine disappeared as a separate academic unity
when the Department of Tropical Medicine was fused with the Department of
Comparative Pathology ofthe Medical School.66
For years Strong used the materials collected in Peru on Oroya fever, verruga, and
leishmaniasis to instruct students who were trained according to the principle that each
disease responded to a single causative organism. The general course oftropical medicine
was taught by Strong himself, who presented a comprehensive review of all diseases that
mightbe considered tropical, including dysenteries, yellow fever, cholera, plague, malaria
and verruga peruana. However, with the exception ofan article dated 1924, Strong did not
return to study Carrion's disease until the late 1930s.
After 1915, Strong was very active in organizing new expeditions to other areas ofthe
world, such as Serbia, the Amazon, the Belgian Congo, and Guatemala, with the purpose
of investigating new diseases and obtaining teaching materials.67 These expeditions
increased his academic prestige and validated his scientific claims among U.S. scientists.
Meanwhile, Peruvian bacteriologists were digesting Strong's 1913 conclusions and
Hideyo Noguchi, a Japanese-American scientist, appeared on the scene.
Noguchi and the Peruvians
Strong's conclusions had a contradictory impact on Peruvian medical circles. On the
one hand, a senior prestigious foreign scientist had recognized excellence in a local
researcher; on the other, Strong had denied the Peruvian physicians' belief in the
etiological unity of Oroya fever and verruga peruana. The nationalistic and professional
tradition partly based around Carrion's "sacrifice" held back Peruvian physicians from
accepting the possibility that Carri6n had died in vain. The bacteriologist Oswaldo
Hercelles declared that Strong studied only one human case which was mistakenly
diagnosed as verruga and declared that his conclusions "injured" the national pride of
Peruvian doctors.68
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Moreover, Strong's conclusions were considered an attack on the local medical tradition
that believed that because of climate and topography some native diseases had particular
manifestations. According to Odriozola, the "intervention of bacteriology" was disturbing
"profound clinical notions", andheraised his voice against Strong's "dissociativecrusade".69
In addition, when in 1916 the physician Julian Arce inaugurated the new chair of tropical
medicine at the University of San Marcos, he argued that Carrion's disease was the best
example among tropical diseases of the "absolute dependency" of microorganisms and
vectors on geographic distribution and local climatic conditions.70 This attitude continued in
a major work on the medical geography of Peru published in 1925 by the directors of the
Direccion de Salubridad Publica and the Instituto Nacional de Vacuna and Sueroterapia, who
argued that local surveys made a strong case in favour ofthe common origin ofverruga and
Oroya fever.71 In the same year, Monge Medrano wrote a general description ofthe disease
foraGermanjournal in whichheemphasized that Strong had studied"one [human] case" for
only three months and that his statements on a dual etiological origin were not sustained by
the clinical and epidemiological observations ofPeruvian physicians.72
Most foreign scientists dismissed the Peruvian complaints as an indication of a
backward scientific tradition in which nationalistic concerns took the place of research.
An exception was Charles Townsend, who shared the Peruvian beliefofa unified etiology
for both diseases. His disagreement with Strong is understandable, considering he was
exposed for longer to the environment where the disease took place-he spent two years
in Peru-and where it was passionately discussed. In addition, Townsend followed the
infection with, and recovery from, Oroya fever and verruga peruana of a Briton who had
assisted his experiments in the Andes.73
One reviewer from London's Tropical Diseases Bureau characterized Townsend's
statements as "controversial", and another commented on the work ofa Peruvian scientist
in the following terms: "The author evidently does not accept the well-grounded
conclusion of the expedition of the Harvard School of Tropical Medicine . . .
Consequently it wouldtend to confusion topublish an abstract ofhispaper."74The clinical
and geographical evidence cited by Peruvians was not considered enough to defend the
assumption that Oroya fever and verruga had a single cause. Many foreign scientists
believed that the Peruvians had to conform to the normative rules ofbacteriology in order
to prove their clinical arguments. This was the beginning, or rather a continuation, of a
controversy over Carrion's disease that could be settled once and for all only by isolating
the causative microorganism ofboth infections and comparing their immune reactions.
69 Emesto Odriozola, 'Unidad de la enfermedad de 73 Townsend, op. cit., note 31 above.
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Curiously, after the Strong expedition, Barton's findings of 1909 began to be accepted
by Peruvian scientists. Local bacteriological research experimented with Bartonella
bacillifornis underthe assumption that it was the causative agent ofboth diseases. During
more than a decade, however, these efforts proved fruitless. In 1924, a Peruvian
bacteriologist reviewed the most important work that had attempted to obtain the
Bartonella culture using Oroya fever and concluded: "Up to this point, all attempts to
obtain the reproduction oftheparasites outside the organism have been withoutresults".75
When Peruvian researchers were unable to show that Bartonella played a role in
verruga peruana, Hideyo Noguchi, a Japanese-American scientist working at the
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, became deeply interested in the debate and
gave what is considered today the solution to the riddle. Noguchi was an compulsive
worker who was proud ofobtaining results where nobody else could, on subjects ranging
from snake venoms, syphilis, trachoma, poliomyelitis, and bartonellosis to yellow fever.
Noguchi's first encounter with Carrion's disease took place in 1919 when he travelled
from his laboratory in New York to Peru as part ofa Rockefeller Foundation commission
that was studying yellow fever. Over the next few years, Noguchi was able to obtain
Peruvian materials on verruga and Oroya fever thanks to his association with Telemaco
Battistini, a Peruvian student at the Rockefeller Institute. In addition, both Hercelles and
Strong sent to Noguchi tissues from cases ofOroya fever and verruga.
With these materials Noguchi published in the mid-1920s a series of articles (some of
them co-authored with Battistini) in which he described an artificial culture ofBartonella
bacilliformis and the successful experimentation with animals. Noguchi found the
characteristic bacilliform bodies present in the red cells, and cultivated a microorganism
of similar appearance in 1925. The culture was inoculated into young monkeys and was
found tobe capable ofinducing characteristic verruga peruana on the skin. Although these
experiments already suggested that Oroya fever and verruga peruana were of common
origin, it was also necessary to isolate the organism from human warts and test its
behaviour on animals. Through the co-operation ofOswaldo Hercelles, then professor of
bacteriology at San Marcos, nodules excised from two cases of verruga were secured for
Noguchi early in 1926.76 From one of these, a culture was obtained which did not differ
in any respect from that previously cultivated from the blood of the Oroya fever patient.
This culture reproduced the characteristic Oroya fever as well as Peruvian wart in
monkeys. Noguchi was able to recover the microorganism again from blood or warts of
the inoculated animals. Those animals which did not succumb to the experimental
infection recovered completely and became resistant to a second attempt to infect them.
Noguchi used this fact to explain the discrepancy between the result of Carrion's
experiment and that of the Harvard Commission.77 According to Noguchi, Carri6n was
susceptible to infection with bartonella, while the "volunteer" inoculated by the Harvard
commission was resistant, probably because he had suffered from a earlier attack.
75 Raul Rebagliati, 'Microbiologfa de la 77 In 1926, Noguchi and Battistini co-signed three
enfermedad de Carri6n', Revista de la Sociedad articles on Carri6n's disease, but the final and
Medica Union Fernandina, 1926, 1: 13. definitive report was signed only by Noguchi. See
76 The correspondence between Noguchi and Hideyo Noguchi, 'The etiology ofthe verruga
Hercelles appears in: Oswaldo Hercelles, 'El germen peruana', J. exp. Med., 1927, 45: 175-89. In 1926 in
de la verruga peruana', Anales de la Facultad de a confusing incident Battistini broke abruptly with
Medicina, 1926, 12: 248-50. Noguchi and returned to Peru.
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Noguchi's achievement provided Peruvian scientists with the bacteriological proof they
were lacking.78 As aresult, the disease became internationally known as Carri6n's disease
(although the term human bartonellosis is also used today), Carri6n's death appeared
vindicated, and the local medical tradition reassured.
Nevertheless, this was not the end of Strong's work in Peru. In 1936, on retiring from
his professorship at Harvard, he decided to organize a new expedition to Peru to confirm
or refute Noguchi's work. There was no institutional pressure to return to a topic then
considered of secondary importance, especially for somebody who was already a leading
figure in U.S. medicine. However, Strong knew that this was the last field expedition he
would carry out and probably wanted to end his career by returning to the topic that had
fascinated him during his first year at Harvard. The new expedition to Peru faced severe
difficulties and had to be supported by a private fund and by monetary contributions from
members of the party, who paid for their own personal and research expenses, which
included the shipment from India to Peru offifteen Rhesus monkeys.
No new discoveries occurred during Strong's 1937 expedition, which confirmed
Noguchi's finding that Oroya fever and verruga peruana had the same causative
microorganism.79 Strong was aware that nationalistic and scientific concerns were
intertwined in the debate and tried to handle carefully the feelings ofPeruvians. In a letter
to a former officer ofthe Rockefeller Foundation Strong wrote:
The Peruvian doctors regard the form ofanemia we are going to study as rather aprivate affair since
it is-not known to occur in any other country and our contacts will have to be made discreetly and
diplomatically in order not to arouse any jealousy or antagonism. In fact, it is my plan to have at
least one Peruvian physician associated with us in the work.80
It is significant that the final investigations on Carrion's disease were carried out either
abroad or by foreigners. The increasingly important role played by U.S. researchers was
partly an outcome of the limitations of Peruvian bacteriology, and especially of its
inability to create a permanent and independent institutional basis.
The visit ofNoguchi to Peru coincided with a reorganization of the Peruvian state that
changed the institutional basis in which bacteriology emerged. A civilian dictator, the
businessman Augusto B Leguia, initiated in 1919 an era of heavy spending on public
works, favourable conditions for foreign investment in export-producing areas, and small
regard for democratic expression. Assuming that local resources and personnel were
insufficient and inadequate, Leguia delegated several of the state's responsibilities (like
education, sanitation andtechnological improvements foragriculture) to U.S. experts. The
78 During the 1920s Noguchi and Strong were he initially received recognition proved to be
involved in another debate. Noguchi isolated a erroneous. See Isabel Plesset, Noguchi and his
spirochetal agent, which he called Leptospira patrons, London and Toronto, Associated University
icteroides, believing it to be the cause ofyellow Press, 1980.
fever. Strong wrote letters to Noguchi complaining 79 The results appeared only in Peru, Richard P
that he could not repeat the experiment. Noguchi Strong, etal., 'Investigaci6n sobre la severa forma de
avoided Strong and othercritics, attributing the anemia infecciosa en la enfermedad de Carri6n y su
uniqueness ofhis finding to his own ability. By the estado eruptivo verrugas (nota preliminar de trabajo
late 1920s it was clear that Noguchi was wrong. See de la Universidad de Harvard en el Peru en 1937),'
Cueto, 'Sanitation', op. cit., note 1 above. Noguchi's La Revista Medica, 1937, 267: 739-40.
work on human bartonellosis was one ofhis most 80 Strong to Jerome Greene, 30 December 1936,
outstanding contributions. His research on Strong Papers, Box 4, Folder 'Peru Expedition
poliomyelitis, trachoma, and yellow fever for which 1937', FCL-HMS.
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new trend was clear when Leguia named two Americans in succession to direct the
Direccion de Salubridad Publica. The Americans were followed by a Peruvian
psychiatrist, Doctor Sebastian Lorente, committed to public hygiene, which he described
as: "a science that is destined to do more good than all the other medical devices
discovered or administered combined".81 Under Lorente's influence, Peruvian sanitation
paid less attention to basic research, and fewer resources were allocated for the
development of local scientific capabilities in bacteriology, which before the Leguia
regime had been justified in terms of its potential benefit for public health.
Leguia's emphasis on applied science increased routine work in the bacteriology
laboratories because they were supported directly or indirectly by the State. The staff of
the Instituto Municipal de Higiene ofLima, for example, became overloaded with routine
tasks like the analysis of potable water and beverages, the extermination of rats, and the
production ofserums and vaccines. These duties were heavy because the city was growing
rapidly while the staffand resources ofthe laboratory were diminishing. The reports ofthe
directors of the Instituto Municipal during the 1920s and early 1930s complain of poor
material facilities and the scanty and outdated materials for bacteriological research, all
indicating this centre's decay.82
In the 1920s, there was less time and space forbasic research because the romantic vision
of the previous two decades that bacteriology alone would eradicate infectious disease
seemed exaggerated. In Peru as elsewhere, serum and vaccine therapies, the great hopes of
bacteriology ofthe late nineteenth century, were considered by many doctors a dead end.83
The first Peruvian bacteriologists linked their research to the fight against infectious and
tropical diseases which drained resources from the country. By 1920, however, the
campaign against endemic and epidemic conditions seemed to the Peruvian authorities to
be a matter of money and technique, and that additional research was not necessary.
Carri6n's disease, which was the centre of attention of Peruvian bacteriologists, was a
rural disease of secondary economic importance, endemic only in narrow Andean valleys
where the majority of inhabitants had developed a natural immunity. It was well-known
that one way to avoid the disease was to use a mosquito net or to prevent strangers from
sleeping in areas where the vector existed, since it was a nocturnal insect. In addition, the
census of 1940 found a curious polarized distribution of the Andean population, i.e. the
majority of people lived below and above the endemic areas of verruga. These facts
reduced the economic relevance of Barton's discovery and undermined Peruvian
bacteriology's claim to utility.84
81 Sebastian Lorente, Nuestrosproblemas medico Municipalidad de Lima, 1932-1933, p. 389,
sociales, Lima, Imp. Americana, 1922. Biblioteca de la Municipalidad de Lima.
82 The reports appeared under different titles in the 83 See John M Dent, 'Two Views ofbacteriology at
annual municipal reports, an incomplete list is Harvard', Senior Honors Thesis, Harvard University,
'Memoria de la inspecci6n de higiene, desinfecci6n, 1982.
quimica y bacteriologia', Memoria de la 84 The distribution of the population is explained
Municipalidad de Lima, 1920, pp. 1-7; 'Memoria de also by the fertility of the soil, see Arnstides Herfer,
la inspecci6n de higiene y vacuna', Memoria de la Epidemiologfa de la verruga peruana, Lima,
Municipalidad de Lima, 1925, pp. 77-85; 'Memoria Gonzales-Mugaburu, 1990, p. 12. Another indicator
de la inspecci6n de quimica y bacteriologia', of the relative unimportance of the disease is the fact
Memoria de la Municipalidad de Lima, 1928-1929, that between 1923 and 1931 the Dos de Mayo
pp. 245-60; and 'Memoria de la inspecci6n de hospital received 484 cases of Carri6n's disease. By
qufmica y bacteriologia', Memoria de la contrast, during the same period there were 11,589
362Tropical Medicine andBacteriology in Boston and Peru
The young and dispersed group ofbacteriologists was unable to respond effectively to
the new challenges. The achievements ofthe earliergeneration ofPeruvian bacteriologists
were more difficult to replicate and the work of foreign scientists ultimately surpassed
local work.85 The decay of Peruvian bacteriology during the 1920s also resulted from
local institutional weaknesses present from the very beginning. The different locations in
which bacteriology was practised were not primarily dedicated to research, but rather to
developing cures, educating physicians, and performing sanitary tasks.
Bacteriology was originally carried on in centres such as hospitals, the Instituto
Municipal de Higiene and the Faculty of Medicine. Initially, institutional dispersion was
beneficial because it generated competition to resolve the etiological question ofCarrion's
disease. But in another sense, it discouraged the consolidation of a scientific community
because work tended to be duplicated, there was no uniformity in scientific
apprenticeship, and resources were not centralized. Dispersion partly explains the lack of
a more ambitious research programme. The search for one causative agent, the
concentration on morphological description, and the lack of advanced local studies in
entomology, all revealed the absence ofhigher goals in Peruvian bacteriology.
Peruvian bacteriology remained in decay until 1936, when Telemaco Battistini created
the Instituto Nacional de Salud. A new generation ofmicrobiologists, with few ties to past
traditions and little knowledge of the development of their discipline, was formed here.
This was the beginning of a new cycle of boom and bust similar to that which
characterized the emergent period ofPeruvian bacteriology.
Conclusion
Carrion's self-experimentation became a central ingredient in the Peruvian medical
tradition and in the assumptions of Peruvian bacteriology. His experience reinforced the
belief that there was a medical geography unique to the country that could be best
understood by local practitioners and scientists. Initially, Barton's discovery of 1909 was
not completely recognized, locally or internationally, until validated by the authoritative
workand word ofaHarvard scientist.86 However, otherdimensions ofStrong's work were
disputed by Peruvian physicians with arguments that partly reflected their preference for
clinical and geographical frameworks.
The difficulties confronted by bacteriological research in Peru and even the perception
of the success of Strong's expedition of 1913, suggest a more general process in which
novel institutional structures and new knowledge in tropical medicine were attached to
particular interests and validated by international networks, where scientists from
cases ofmalaria. Andres Arana Sialer, Estadistica productivity declined, see Rebagliati, op. cit., note 27
hospitalaria, Lima, Imp. del Hospital Victor Larco above, pp. 191-204.
Herrera, 1933, pp. 8, 10, 13, 16. In the 1940s, DDT 86 Bart6n's case resembles that ofthe Cuban Carlos
controlled the sandfly and antibiotics treated the J Finlay, who presented a basically correct theory of
anaemia produced by Oroya fever. the mosquito transmission ofyellow fever in 1881,
85 One exception was Pedro Weiss, 'Hacia una which was not accepted for almost twenty years. See'
concepci6n de la verruga peruana', Anales de la Nancy Stepan, 'The interplay between socio-
Facultad de Medicina, 1926, 9: 279-99. A economic factors and medical science: yellow fever
bibliography ofmedical studies on Carrion's disease research, Cuba and the United States', Soc. Stud.
from 1885 to 1935 indicated that after 1920 Peruvian Sci., 1978, 8: 397-424.
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backward countries usually had little powerand resources. This appears clearin Peru were
science was carried out under adverse conditions such as a chronic lack of funds, scarce
institutional continuity, irregular support fromthe state and changing public esteem. Partly
because of this context, Peruvian bacteriologists had to be flexible, accommodating
different and sometimes contradictory dimensions ofthe work ofnationals and foreigners,
and they resorted to both old medical traditions and new scientific paradigms. However,
in this case, their efforts were insufficient to overcome the institutional and political
obstacles that arrested the development of Peruvian bacteriology. Other Latin American
examples, like the Instituto Oswaldo Cruz ofBrasil, suggest that it was possible to sustain
a balance between sanitary tasks and original basic research under adverse conditions.87
A final question is why Strong did not find a permanent academic niche for tropical
medicine at Harvard? Strong's energy and reputation and the support of a prestigious
academic institution and of Boston's elite were enough to launch tropical medicine as an
independent academic entity in Boston but not to sustain it. Although this result might be
related to the scientific expeditions that Strong organized after 1913 and to U.S.
developments that I have not presented here, I will suggest two complementary answers
to the question. First, tropical medicine in Boston never achieved a permanent alliance
between local needs, the interests of the government or of the military, and the goals of
private philanthropy. Second, the U.S. governments of the first decades of the twentieth
century were reluctant to recognize that they played an imperial role in the independent
republics ofLatin America. This mighthave been amajordifference between the U.S. and
those European countries that defined and supported academic tropical medicine as a
crucial component oftheir formal empires.
87 See Stepan, op. cit., note 1 above, and
Benchimol and Teixeira, op. cit., note 45 above.
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